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to dismiss him. Perhaps the truest objection to Turner, and the one 
most often spoken and unspoken, was best expressed in a study of the 
Midwest where the authors wrote: "We need our own story.''38 As an 
iconoclast, Turner would not find that idea objectionable. As he 
wrote, and put in italics, in his essay on "The Significance of His- 
tory": after all "Each age writes the history of the past anew with reference to 
the conditions uppermost in its own time." 
Frontier Democracy: The Turner Thesis Revisited 
Lacy K. Ford, Jr. 
The one-hundredth anniversary of Frederick Jackson Turner's pres- 
entation of his pathbreaking essay, "The Significance of the Frontier 
in American History," to the American Historical Association meet- 
ing in Chicago provides a propitious occasion for a brief reassessment 
of the "frontier thesis" and its lingering influence on the historiogra- 
phy of antebellum America. Turner's frontier thesis, with its empha- 
sis on cheap western land and abundant economic opportunity, 
captured the popular imagination more than any other sweeping ex- 
planation of how the American national character was formed.' The 
two chief rivals of Turner's frontier thesis-Charles Beard's theme of 
recurring economic conflict between agrarian interests and commer- 
cial capitalism and Louis Hartz's contention that the principal forma- 
tive influence on American character was a longstanding "liberal" 
consensus on the efficacy of political democracy and free-market capi- 
talism-have both earned as much attention from scholars as has 
38 Ibid., 126. 
Lacy K. Ford, Jr., is Associate Professor of History at the University of 
South Carolina. His book, Origins of Southern Radicalism. The South Carolina Upcountry, 
1800-1860 (1988) won the Francis Butler Simkins Prize of the Southern Historical 
Association. 
Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History," in Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1893 (Wash- 
ington, D.C. 1894), 197-228. For a recent reevaluation of Turner, see William 
Cronon, "Revisiting the Vanishing Frontier: The Legacy of Frederick Jackson 
Turner," Western Historical Quarterly, 18 (Apr. 1987), 157-176. 
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Turner's interpretation; but neither challenger has so captured the 
public mind.2 Hartz's argument for pervasive liberalism proved to be 
a period piece heavily influenced by the solid anti-communist front of 
the 1950s as well as that era's vanilla image of Americans as "Ike"- 
voting, "Lucy"-watching, middle-class conformists. Hartz's liberal 
consensus position, which had always strained to explain away the 
Civil War, easily was shattered by the contentious decade of the 
1960s, with its raucous challenge to established mores.3 Beard's eco- 
nomic-conflict thesis, fully articulated by 1930, has demonstrated con- 
siderably more staying power among historians. Many active 
scholars, led by those on the political left, still emphasize economic 
struggle and class conflict as the chief sources of creative tension in 
American history.4 But if modified Beardian interpretations remain 
visible in American historiography after more than half a century, his 
influence has always been felt primarily within the academy. The 
larger reading public remains almost instinctively resistant to any 
suggestion that their history has been riddled with class conflict. 
Firmly attached to the idea of American exceptionalism, Americans 
have searched their history (however superficially) for the source of 
their nation's singular character, and they have found in Turner's 
frontier thesis a plausible, and perhaps even compelling, explana- 
tion.5 Very recently, in his inaugural call for American renewal, new 
President Bill Clinton articulated a thoroughly Turnerian view of 
Americans as "a restless, questing, hopeful people."6 
2 For Beard's overview, see Charles Beard and Mary Beard, The Rise of Ameri- 
can Civilization (New York 1927); Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America. An 
Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution (New York 1955); and John 
Patrick Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations 
of Liberalism (New York 1984), 122. 
3 Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American 
Historical Profession (Cambridge, Mass. 1988), 320-468. 
4 Richard Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians. Turner, Beard, Parrington (New 
York 1968), 167-346; Lee Benson, Turner and Beard. American Historical Writing Recon- 
sidered (New York 1960), 95-213; John Patrick Diggins, "Power and Authority in 
American History: The Case of Charles A. Beard and His Critics," American Histori- 
cal Review, 86 (Oct. 1981), 701-730. 
5 David W. Noble, Historians Against History. The Frontier Thesis and the National 
Covenant in American Historical Writing Since 1830 (Minneapolis 1965), esp. 37-55; Jack- 
son K. Putnam, "The Turner Thesis and the Westward Movement: A Reap- 
praisal," Western Historical Quarterly, 7 (Oct. 1976), 377-404; Martin Ridge, 
"Frederick Jackson Turner and His Ghost: The Writing of Western History," Pro- 
ceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, 101 (Apr. 1991), 65-76. 
6 New York (N.Y.) Times, Jan. 21, 1993. 
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It is hardly surprising that when Americans seek inspiration from 
their past that they would turn to the cautious progressive, Turner, 
rather than to the radical Beard.7 After all, if Walt Whitman was the 
poet laureate of American democracy, Frederick Jackson Turner was 
its first professional court historian. But perhaps more importantly, 
there is arguably something about Turner and his frontier thesis, in- 
spired as it was by the twilight years of the nineteenth century, that 
speaks directly to our condition in the waning years of the twentieth. 
The normally optimistic Turner wrote his celebrated frontier es- 
say in an odd moment of anxiety, as he fretted over a casual observa- 
tion by a census bureau official that the 1890 enumeration revealed 
no discernible outer boundary of settlement, no legitimate "fron- 
tier."8 Turner worried that the passing of the frontier marked a point 
of no return in the steady purchase of urbanization and industrializa- 
tion on the essentially agrarian republic of the nineteenth century. He 
feared that the Jeffersonian ideals of the family-farm yeomanry were 
being sacrificed on the altar of industrial capitalism by Wall Street's 
high priests of finance. Moreover, even though the nation's popula- 
tion was overwhelmingly rural when Turner was born in 1861, it had 
become nearly half urban by the time he wrote his frontier essay, and 
by 1920, when Turner published a book of essays reprinting his much 
acclaimed frontier piece, a majority of the American people lived in 
urban areas. As small-farm America disappeared, Turner, an affec- 
tionate son of the middle border, saw his worst nightmare realized: a 
cramped, crowded, "Europeanized" America that was losing its dis- 
tinctiveness. With the budding Populist revolt of the 1890s providing 
unmistakable background noise, the provincial Turner wrote his fron- 
tier essay to warn of impending decline.9 
Late twentieth-century Americans labor under a surprisingly sim- 
ilar anxiety. The United States' modern self-image as a powerful in- 
dustrial behemoth, a nation with "big shoulders," is being tried 
sorely by the enervating competition of a new global economy. The 
apparent decline of heavy industry, the flow of jobs overseas, and a 
per capita income that has fallen out of the world's top dozen have 
7 Novick, That Noble Dream, 87-108. 
8 Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians, 47-83; Benson, Turner and Beard, 41-91. 9 Martin Ridge, "Frederick Jackson Turner, Ray Allen Billington, and Amer- 
ican Frontier History," Western Historical Quarterly, 19 (Jan. 1988), 4-20. Turner ex- 
plained why he feared that the closing of the frontier portended decline again in his 
"The Significance of the Sections in American History," Wisconsin Magazine of His- 
tory, 8 (Mar. 1925), 255-280. 
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sparked fears about the coming post-industrial order that closely par- 
allel the fears Americans of the 1890s felt about the emerging indus- 
trial order. Moreover, the winding down of America's industrial 
century has been marked by a demographic shift that parallels the 
rapid urbanization of the late nineteenth century. In the 1990s, for 
the first time, the majority of Americans are neither rural nor urban 
but suburban. Just as the alleged closing of the western frontier sig- 
naled Turner that the agrarian republic was losing out to urban, in- 
dustrial society, deindustrialization and the movement of people to 
the crabgrass frontier suggest to many late twentieth-century Ameri- 
cans the disconcerting arrival of new, post-industrial, suburban soci- 
ety.10 
This angst of the post-modern era informs our moment for review- 
ing Turner's old arguments on behalf of American exceptionalism, 
and particularly his contention that the frontier served as the "socio- 
cultural furnace" in which American democracy was forged." In re- 
cent decades, two identifiable trends in American historiography have 
borne more or less directly on Turner's "frontier democracy" hy- 
pothesis. One of these trends involves the rapidly proliferating body 
of literature labeled as the "new social history" and the "new eco- 
nomic history." These studies employ an array of analytical tech- 
10 For a brief introduction to these themes, see Lester C. Thurow, The Zero-Sum 
Society: Distribution a d the Possibilitiesfor Economic Change (New York 1980); Robert B. 
Reich, The Work of Nations. Preparing Ourselvesfor Twenty-First Century Capitalism (New 
York 1991); Robert Kuttner, The End of Laissez-Faire: National Purpose and The Global 
Economy After the Cold War (New York 1991); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of 
the Great Powers (New York 1988); William Schneider, "The Suburban Century Be- 
gins," The Atlantic, 270 (July 1992), 33-44; and Kenneth T. Jackson, The Crabgrass 
Frontier. The Suburbanization of the United States (New York 1985), 231-305. 
" Michael P. Malone, "Beyond the Last Frontier: Toward a New Approach to 
Western American History," Western Historical Quarterly, 20 (Nov. 1989), 409-427 
(quotation at 410). Turner, a product of his era as well as his region, defined "de- 
mocracy" in such a way that it applied essentially to males, and usually to white 
males. Thus he found "democratic" leanings among people who advocated ex- 
tremely anti-democratic measures regarding women, African-Americans (slave and 
free), and Native Americans. In addition to the first article cited in this note, these 
severe problems with Turner's understanding of democracy have been vividly enu- 
merated in Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest. The Unbroken Past of the 
American West (New York 1987); Joan M. Jensen and Darlis A. Miller, "The Gentle 
Tamers Revisited: New Approaches to the History of Women in the American 
West," Pacific Historical Review, 49 (May 1980), 173-213; and Cronon, "The Vanish- 
ing Frontier," 173-176. For this essay, I have attempted to examine the effect of the 
frontier on American "democracy" using Turner's own understanding of democracy 
as the standard, so that his work might be judged on its own terms. 
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niques and computerized data bases, borrowed from the social 
sciences, to study migration patterns, social mobility, wealth distribu- 
tion, and class structure. These methodologically sophisticated ap- 
proaches have produced a number of detailed studies of nineteenth- 
century communities, regions, and social groups and facilitated the 
first rigorous empirical testing of Turner's safety-valve argument.12 
The other historiographical trend that is especially relevant to any 
reassessment of Turner's thesis is the recent flurry of state, local, and 
regional studies of political culture during the American middle pe- 
riod. These studies, heavily influenced by the "republican synthesis" 
that reshaped our understanding of revolutionary era politics during 
the 1970s, pay special attention to issues such as suffrage and repre- 
sentation, and hence shed important new light on the social forces 
driving political democratization in antebellum America.13 
The recent wealth of scholarship using the methods of the "new 
social" or "new economic" history still begs for coherent synthesis, 
but on balance this literature suggests that if "frontier democracy" 
meant anything like social or economic equality, or even rough equal- 
ity of opportunity, then western reality fell far short of the Turnerian 
ideal. As a rule on the American frontier, from Ohio and Tennessee 
westward to California, settlement was followed quickly by the emer- 
12 For an introduction to this vast literature, see Howard P. Chudacoff, "Suc- 
cess and Security: The Meaning of Social Mobility in America," Reviews in American 
History, 10 (Dec. 1982), 101-112; Theodore K. Rabb, "The Development of Quanti- 
fication in Historical Research," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 13 (Spring 1983), 
591-602; J. Morgan Kousser, "The State of Social Science History in the Late 
1980s," Historical Methods, 22 (Winter 1989), 13-20; Hugh Rockoff, "History and 
Economics," Social Science History, 15 (Summer 1991), 239-264; and Lance E. Davis 
and Stanley Engerman, "Cliometrics: The State of the Science (or Is It Art or, per- 
haps, Witchcraft?)," Historical Methods, 20 (Summer 1987), 97-106. Bernard Bailyn, 
"The Challenge of Modern Historiography," American Historical Review, 87 (Feb. 
1982), 1-24, is perhaps the most prominent of many works that express skepticism 
about the recent trend toward treating history as a social science. Richard Jensen, 
"On Modernizing Frederick Jackson Turner: The Historiography of Regionalism," 
Western Historical Quarterly, 11 (July 1980), 307-322, briefly examines how the commu- 
nity and regional focus of the "new" social science-oriented history has revived inter- 
est in Turner's arguments. 
13 For analysis of this trend, see Daniel T. Rodgers, "Republicanism: The Ca- 
reer of a Concept," Journal of American History, 79 (June 1992), 11-38; Joyce Appleby, 
"Republicanism and Ideology," American Quarterly, 37 (Fall 1985), 461-473; Sean 
Wilentz, "On Class and Politics in Jacksonian America," Reviews in American History, 
10 (Dec. 1982), 45-63; and Robert E. Shalhope, "Republicanism and Early Ameri- 
can Historiography," William and Mary Quarterly, 39 (Apr. 1982), 334-356. 
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gence of powerful local elites, often composed of successful land spe- 
culators who quickly stamped their influence on their locale. Some 
members of these elites were self-made men, but most drew heavily 
on family wealth and connections back in the East.14 Upward mobility 
rates in frontier areas as different as Chillicothe, Ohio, in the early 
1800s and San Francisco in the 1850s suggest a degree of opportunity 
only slightly greater than that available in long-established eastern cit- 
ies, and if opportunity to move up was slightly greater in frontier 
towns than eastern cities, so too was the possibility of going broke.15 
The boom or bust economies of frontier towns so frightened 
newly formed elites that fierce competition among aspiring banking 
and mercantile leaders often grudgingly gave way to a spirit of volun- 
tary cooperation. Frontier entrepreneurs quickly realized that their 
individual fortunes depended heavily on the larger economic fate of 
their towns, and that the towns themselves competed with nearby ri- 
vals for population, trade, and government favor. Thus the relentless 
quest for economic growth, some authors suggest, turned frontier 
towns into centers of bourgeois cooperation and boosterism rather 
than the testing ground of rugged individualism suggested by Turner- 
ian lore.16 Of course, as Don H. Doyle has rightly reminded us, any 
model of frontier towns that emphasizes only entrepreneurial collabo- 
ration is as unbalanced as Turner's emphasis on unfettered individu- 
alism. Despite the harmonious images projected by boosters, frontier 
towns witnessed violence and conflict with "southerners caning Yan- 
kees, vigilante mobs chasing abolitionists, Christians squabbling over 
the doctrine of infant baptism, police raids on Irish grog shops," and 
other types of internecine quarrels.17 Frontier elites reluctantly 
14 For an historiographical overview, see Ralph Mann, "Frontier Opportunity 
and the New Social History," Pacific Historical Review, 53 (Nov. 1984), 463-491. 
15 Peter Decker, Fortunes and Failures. White Collar Mobility in Nineteenth Century 
San Francisco (Cambridge, Mass. 1978); Jeffrey P. Brown, "Chillicothe's Elite: Lead- 
ership in a Frontier Community," Ohio History, 96 (Summer/Autumn 1987), 140- 
156; Stephan Thernstrom, The Other Bostonians. Poverty and Progress in the American Me- 
tropolis, 1880-1970 (Cambridge, Mass. 1973); Clyde and Sally Griffen, Natives and 
Newcomers: The Ordering of Opportunity in Mid-Nineteenth Century Poughkeepsie (Cam- 
bridge, Mass. 1978). 
16 This frontier-as-incubator-of-cooperation argument was pioneered by Stanley 
Elkins and Eric McKitrick, "A Meaning For Turner's Frontier, Part I: Democracy 
in the Old Northwest," Political Science Quarterly, 69 (Sept. 1954), 321-353; and Daniel 
Boorstin, The Americans. The National Experience (New York 1965), esp. 113-168. 
17 Don Harrison Doyle, "Social Theory and New Communities in Nineteenth- 
Century America," Western Historical Quarterly, 8 (Apr. 1977), 151-165 (quotation at 
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acknowledged the futility of eliminating such conflict, but they em- 
braced the idea of containing these conflicts within acceptable bound- 
aries as the key to social stability and economic growth. 
The instruments for controlling inevitable conflict, according to 
Doyle, were the civic, religious, and political institutions that eventu- 
ally came to dominate frontier towns. These churches, political par- 
ties, and business clubs served to institutionalize conflict, thereby 
diverting sectarian disputes, political grudges, and business rivalries 
into channels where rational, if heated, debate displaced violent phys- 
ical assault. These voluntary institutions, Doyle emphasizes, did not 
eliminate conflict so much as routinize it, but in so doing they pro- 
vided venues and organizations through which like-minded members 
of frontier communities pursued common goals. Thus frontier towns 
were sustained not by the individual self-assertion celebrated by 
Turner nor by the neighborly cooperation touted by his early critics, 
but by the rapid evolution of the unglamorous social bureaucracies of 
churches, schools, civic clubs, and political parties. If frontier towns 
defined American democracy, then the latter is better understood as 
the product of pious "joiners," sociable women, and "clubable" 
middle-class men than the heroic egalitarians of Turner's imagined 
West.18 
Recent studies of the rural frontier, in both North and South, also 
present an ambiguous picture of opportunity and social mobility. The 
rural North, where commercial agriculture predominated but the scar- 
city of labor limited farm size, boasted a more even distribution of 
wealth than either the rural South, where slaves provided the planta- 
tion labor force, or the urban North, where propertyless free laborers 
constituted a significant portion of the population. But even in the ru- 
ral North, as Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman have pointed out, the 
distribution of wealth hardly fit the "classic egalitarian" model. By 
1860, the richest 20 percent of all households in the rural North con- 
trolled over 60 percent of the wealth.19 This distribution was markedly 
more even than that of the cotton South, where the wealthiest 
157). Earlier works that emphasize conflict on the frontier include Allen G. Bogue, 
"Social Theory and the Pioneer," Agricultural History, 34 (Jan. 1960), 21-34; and 
Robert R. Dykstra, The Cattle Towns (New York 1968). 
18 Don Harrison Doyle, The Social Order of a Frontier Community: Jacksonville, Illi- 
nois, 1825-1870 (Urbana 1978), 62-91, 156-193. 
'9 Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman, "The 'Egalitarian Ideal' and the Distribu- 
tion of Wealth in the Northern Agricultural Community: A Backward Look," Review 
of Economics and Statistics, 63 (Feb. 1981), 124-129. 
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Figure 2. Professor Turner, University of Wisconsin, 1881 
Source: State Historical Society of Wisconsin. 
10 percent of households owned over 60 percent of the wealth, or that 
of northern cities such as Boston or New York, where the richest 5 
percent of the population controlled nearly two thirds of the wealth.20 
But within the rural North, once adjustments are made for the differ- 
ing age structure of the populations, wealth was only marginally more 
evenly distributed on the "frontier" (one fifth owning 64 percent) 
than it was in the older Northeast (one fifth owning 67 percent).21 
20 Gavin Wright, The Political Economy of the Cotton South: Households, Markets, and 
Wealth in the Nineteenth Century (New York 1978), 24-37; Edward Pessen, "The Egali- 
tarian Myth and the American Social Reality: Wealth, Mobility, and Equality in the 
'Era of the Common Man'," American Historical Review, 76 (Oct. 1971), 989-1031. 
21 Atack and Bateman, "The 'Egalitarian Ideal,"' 125-126. 
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Even if the frontier did not produce an egalitarian distribution of 
wealth, recent scholarship suggests that prospects for upward mobility 
were reasonably good in antebellum America, and especially good on 
the frontier. Life-cycle models of wealth accumulation presume that 
households grow wealthier as their heads grow older, with accumula- 
tion levelling off as the head approaches "retirement" age. Such 
models neatly explain the economic career of the typical antebellum 
rural white American.22 Roughly two thirds of rural antebellum 
householders owned land (though the percentage varied widely from 
locale to locale and may have been slightly lower in the plantation 
South than elsewhere), and the majority of landless householders were 
young tenants whose chances were reasonably good for acquiring 
land as they grew older.23 
Throughout the antebellum era, this "agricultural ladder" re- 
mained a viable instrument for upward social mobility in both the 
North and South. Young tenants, lacking capital and perhaps exper- 
tise, worked as renters for several years until profit, inheritance, or 
propitious marriage allowed them to purchase land. In the rural 
North, for instance, over 60 percent of all tenant farmers were under 
age forty. While over 23 percent of young farm operators (under the 
age of twenty-five) were tenants, fewer than 7 percent of those over 
age 50 still worked on rented farms.24 A similar pattern held in the 
rural South, where over 60 percent of all tenants had yet to reach age 
22 Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman, "Egalitarianism, Inequality, and Age: 
The Rural North in 1860," Journal of Economic History, 41 (Mar. 1981), 85-93. 
23 The list of local studies documenting this point is far too long to be cited 
here, but for a sampling, see Donald L. Winters, "'Plain Folk' of the Old South 
Reexamined: Economic Democracy in Tennessee," Journal of Southern History, 53 
(Nov. 1987), 565-586; Randolph B. Campbell, "Planters and Plain Folk: Harrison 
County, Texas, as a Test Case, 1850-1860," ibid., 40 (Aug. 1974), 369-398; Donald 
Schaefer, "Yeoman Farmers and Economic Democracy: A Study of Wealth and Ec- 
onomic Mobility in the Western Tobacco Region, 1850-1860," Explorations in Eco- 
nomic History, 15 (Oct. 1978), 421-437; Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman, To Their 
Own Soil: Agriculture in the Antebellum North (Ames, Iowa 1987); Hal S. Barron, Those 
Who Stayed Behind: Rural Society in Nineteenth Century New England (Cambridge, Mass. 
1984); Robert P. Swierenga, "Quantitative Methods in Rural Landholding," Journal 
of Interdisciplinary History, 13 (Spring 1983), 787-808; and Jeremy Atack, "Tenants 
and Yeoman in the Nineteenth Century," Agricultural History, 62 (Summer 1988), 6- 
32. 
24 Jeremy Atack, "The Agricultural Ladder Revisited: A New Look at an Old 
Question with Some Data for 1860," Agricultural History, 63 (Winter 1989), 1-25; 
Donald L. Winters, "Agricultural Tenancy in the Nineteenth Century Middle West: 
The Historiographical Debate," Indiana Magazine of History, 78 (June 1982), 128-153. 
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forty, and where roughly 30 percent of all farm operators under age 
thirty were tenants while all but 12 percent of those over age forty 
owned their own land. Moreover, preliminary study reveals that 
nearly three fourths of all southern tenants in 1850 who remained in 
the same county until 1860 were successful in acquiring land.25 Thus, 
in both the slaveholding and non-slaveholding sections of the pre- 
Civil War United States, prospects for both realizing the Jeffersonian 
dream of land ownership and of steadily increasing one's family 
wealth over a lifetime were quite good even though the overall distri- 
bution of wealth remained highly uneven in all parts of the country. 
Modern scholarship appears to confirm the popular Turnerian 
perception that from the microeconomic vantage point of individual 
households, whether North or South, a decision to move to the fron- 
tier in search of a better life stood a good chance of proving correct. 
Nevertheless, as Harold Woodman has suggested, the aggregate or 
macroeconomic impact of the frontier on the antebellum economy 
and living standards was characterized by ambiguity and important 
regional variations. Between 1840 and 1860, a period of heavy west- 
ward migration, the national economy grew at an impressive rate. 
Due largely to the cotton boom of the 1850s, per capita income in the 
South grew even more rapidly than it did in the North, where per- 
sonal incomes grew by a robust 30 percent during the twenty year 
period. Most of the apparent increase in per capita income in the 
staple-dominated South, however, owed to the movement of people 
out of older cotton and tobacco regions and into the virgin lands of 
the southwestern frontier. Without this movement out of the compar- 
atively low income South Atlantic region and into the flush environ- 
ment of the cotton frontier, personal income in the South would have 
grown more slowly than that of the North, notwithstanding the high 
cotton profits of the 1850s. 
In the cotton South, the availability of agricultural land on the 
frontier may have enhanced inequalities of wealth among whites in 
the region, but it contributed mightily to overall economic growth. In 
the antebellum North, however, the Northeast had both a substan- 
25 Donald L. Winters, "The Agricultural Ladder in Southern Agriculture: 
Tennessee, 1850-1870," Agricultural History, 61 (Summer 1987), 36-52. For a com- 
prehensive discussion of the methodological problems involved in studying tenancy in 
the Old South, see Frederick A. Bode and Donald E. Ginter, Farm Tenancy and the 
Census in Antebellum Georgia (Athens 1986); and John T. Houdek and Charles F. 
Heller, Jr., "Searching for Nineteenth-Century Farm Tenants: An Evaluation of 
Methods," Historical Methods, 19 (Spring 1986), 55-61. 
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tially higher per capita income and a slightly faster rate of growth 
between 1840 and 1860 than did the region closer to the frontier, 
which experienced a 250 percent increase in population during the 
era. In fact, per capita incomes in the industrializing Northeast were 
nearly twice as high as those of the agricultural Northwest in both 
1840 and 1860. In macroeconomic terms at least, northerners who 
left the industrial Northeast for the frontier moved from an area of 
high but very unevenly distributed incomes to an area of significantly 
lower but somewhat more evenly distributed earnings. In the face of 
this evidence, the massive relocation of northerners to the free-state 
frontier appears, on the surface, to represent a curious shift from a 
high-income area to a lower-income area. But a balanced assessment 
of the impact of the free-soil frontier on the antebellum northern 
economy requires an exercise in counterfactual history. Without the 
frontier as an economic "safety-valve," it is doubtful that the North- 
east could have absorbed the large numbers of foreign immigrants it 
received during the 1840s and 1850s and still maintained its high level 
of personal income. Thus the frontier probably helped sustain ante- 
bellum northern prosperity even if it was not that region's engine of 
economic growth. Of course, if frontier land had not been available, 
it is possible that the antebellum North, like the antebellum South, 
would have attracted relatively few immigrants. In that case, income 
growth for native-born northerners might have been impressive de- 
spite the lack of cheap land, but the character of the nation as a 
whole, without the immigration, would have been altered dramati- 
cally.26 
Taken together, these studies of individual social mobility and ag- 
gregate economic development reveal that antebellum America was a 
land of remarkable economic opportunity, and that, as Turner hy- 
pothesized, the frontier did much to enhance that opportunity.27 In 
26 This discussion draws heavily on Harold D. Woodman, "Economic History 
and Economic Theory: The New Economic History in America," Journal of Interdisci- 
plinary History, 3 (Autumn 1972), 323-350; but see also Robert E. Gallman, "Slavery 
and Southern Economic Growth," Southern Economic Journal, 45 (Apr. 1979), 1007- 
1022; Donald F. Schaefer, "A Model of Migration and Wealth Accumulation: 
Farmers at the Antebellum Southern Frontier," Explorations in Economic History, 24 
(Apr. 1987), 130-157; and Richard H. Steckel, "The Economic Foundations of East- 
West Migration During the 19th Century," Explorations in Economic History, 20 (Jan. 
1983), 14-36. 
27 James A. Henretta, "The Study of Social Mobility: Ideological Assumptions 
and Conceptual Bias," Labor History, 18 (Spring 1977), 165-178, and other studies 
154 
A SYMPOSIUM ON FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER 
the South, the continued presence of a cotton frontier drove the re- 
gion's impressive growth. In the North, the dynamics of growth owed 
more to the bustling commerce and budding manufacturing system of 
the Northeast than the frontier bread-basket, but the presence of the 
frontier facilitated northern growth even if it was not its primary 
cause. Yet for many antebellum Americans, economic well-being 
probably was not measured in terms of income levels (which were 
generally improving) or wealth distribution (which was generally 
worsening), but of personal or household independence. The founda- 
tion of independence was ownership and control of productive prop- 
erty, and thus land ownership was often considered a better measure 
of economic status than income. An impressive outpouring of litera- 
ture that often disagrees on other matters supports that the notion 
that, above all else, antebellum Americans loathed the dependence of 
propertyless wage laborers.28 And they were generally successful, in 
the short run, in avoiding what modern scholars, following Marx, call 
"proletarianization," because the frontier eased the way to property 
ownership with its abundant and relatively cheap land.29 In doing so, 
the frontier "safety-valve" undoubtedly helped sustain the Jefferso- 
nian ideal of independence, much as Turner maintained a century 
ago. 
In recent decades, a number of scholars have argued that politics, 
not the frontier, served as the true "safety-valve" in American life. 
The United States, the argument goes, was the only modern indus- 
point out that cliometric work probably overstates the case for upward mobility since 
it tends to focus on those who "persist" over time in the same locale. These "persis- 
ters," it is argued, likely fared better on the average that their more mobile one-time 
neighbors, who moved often because of their lack of economic success. But even if 
recent works overstate the case for general upward mobility in antebellum America, 
the data provides almost incontrovertible proof that there was enough genuine up- 
ward mobility to sustain the popular perception of America, and its frontier, as a 
land of unique opportunity. 
28 For a sample, see Steven Hahn, The Roots of Southern Populism. Yeoman Farmers 
and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 (New York 1983), esp. 15-85; 
J. Mills Thornton III, Politics and Power in a Slave Society. Alabama, 1800-1860 (Baton 
Rouge 1978), 54-58; Lacy K. Ford, Jr., Origins of Southern Radicalism. The South Caro- 
lina Upcountry, 1800-1860 (New York 1988), 44-95; Harry L. Watson, Liberty and 
Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America (New York 1990), 42-72; Bruce Laurie, Work- 
ing People of Philadelphia, 1800-1850 (Philadelphia 1980); and Sean Wilentz, Chants 
Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850 (New 
York 1984), 61-142. 
29 Gavin Wright, "American Agriculture and the Labor Market: What Hap- 
pened to Proletarianization?" Agricultural History, 62 (Summer 1988), 182-209. 
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trial nation to experience its democratic revolution before its indus- 
trial revolution. As a result, its comparatively inclusive politics muted 
social antagonism by directing them into legitimate political chan- 
nels.30 While Turner never offered such an argument, he asserted ve- 
hemently that political democracy was central to American 
distinctiveness, and that the frontier, more than anything else, fos- 
tered democracy. Turner's insistence on this point has been one of 
the most vigorously disputed aspects of his thesis.31 Three generations 
of historians of the Jacksonian working class, from Arthur Schlesin- 
ger, Jr., through Edward Pessen, to Sean Wilentz, have argued per- 
suasively that artisans, mechanics, and urban laborers pushed as hard 
for democracy as did sturdy frontier yeomen.32 Comprehensive stud- 
ies of suffrage by Chilton Williamson and of representation by J.R. 
Pole also challenged Turner's frontier democracy thesis.33 In general, 
liberalized suffrage requirements and more equitable schemes of legis- 
lative apportionment were realized more easily in the frontier states, 
North and South, because democratic forces there had neither en- 
trenched propertied elites nor difficult-to-amend eighteenth-century 
constitutions to contend with. Moreover, recent scholarship suggests 
that pressure for more legislative reapportionment came from areas 
with underrepresented populations, regardless of their proximity to 
the frontier. On this issue, the source of the egalitarian impulse was 
demographic, not geographic.34 And, in at least one regard, states on 
30 For a brief introduction to this argument, see Eric Foner, "Why Is There No 
Socialism in the United States," History Workshop Journal, 17 (Spring 1984), 57-80. 
31 Early criticisms of Turner on this point are well summarized in two articles by 
Benjamin F. Wright, Jr.; see his "American Democracy and The Frontier," Yale 
Review, 20 (Dec. 1930), 349-365, and "Political Institutions and the Frontier," in 
Dixon R. Fox, ed., Sources of Culture in the Middle West. Backgrounds versus Frontier (New 
York 1934), 15-38. 32 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Jackson (New York 1945); Edward Pes- 
sen, Most Uncommon Jacksonians: Radical Leaders of the Early Labor Movement (New York 
1967); Wilentz, Chants Democratic, 172-296. 
33 Chilton Williamson, American Suffrage. From Property to Democracy, 1760-1860 
(Princeton 1960); J. R. Pole, Political Representation in England and the Origins of the 
American Republic (London 1966). 
34 Pole, Political Representation, esp. 281-353. For a sample of more recent investi- 
gations, see Watson, Liberty and Power, 49-52; Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 106- 
113; Marc W. Kruman, Parties and Politics in North Carolina, 1836-1865 (Baton Rouge 
1983), 11-14, 86-103; Merrill D. Peterson, Democracy, Liberty, and Property. The State 
Constitutional Conventions of the 1820s (Indianapolis 1966); and Dickson D. Bruce, Jr., 
The Rhetoric of Conservatism. The Virginia Convention of 1829-30 and the Conservative Tradi- 
tion in the South (San Marino 1982). An older but still very useful account is Fletcher 
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the northern frontier lagged behind the free states on the seaboard: 
five northeastern states permitted free blacks to vote under some cir- 
cumstances, but all of the states of the Old Northwest, the so-called 
"valley of democracy," limited suffrage to whites only.35 
Yet recent historiography has fundamentally restructured our un- 
derstanding of the meaning of "democracy" in its early national and 
Jacksonian contexts. Political "democracy," as it was understood 
through much of the antebellum era, was not a full-blown political 
creed but rather a crucial component in the larger ideology of republi- 
canism. Republican ideology was part of nineteenth-century Ameri- 
ca's political and intellectual inheritance from the revolutionary era, 
and arguably the greatest achievement of the republican founders was 
their embrace of popular sovereignty, the idea that the ultimate politi- 
cal authority lay with the "people," rather than with a king, an aris- 
tocracy, or a supreme Parliament. At the same time, many early 
Americans feared majoritarian tyranny and democratic excess. The 
nation envisioned by the founders was not a democracy where simple 
majorities ruled but a republic whose structure incorporated elaborate 
checks and balances that could stymie renegade majorities as well as 
other threats to individual liberty. Moreover, the founders insisted 
that the success of their republican experiment hinged on the mainte- 
nance of a social order where the widespread ownership of productive 
property sustained an independent citizenry.36 
In theory, at least, the popular political ideologies of the Jack- 
sonian era continued to cherish independence and fear concentrated 
power, even that of majorities. But, in practice, within the larger lan- 
M. Green, Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776-1860. A Study in the 
Evolution of Democracy (Chapel Hill 1930). Green presents his interpretation as evi- 
dence supporting Turner's thesis, but while Green's work supports the case for vig- 
orous democracy in the Old South, his specific findings do not suggest that the 
frontier was democracy's primary agent. 35 Williamson, American Suffrage, 208-222; Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery. The 
Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 (Chicago 1961), 64-112. 
36 Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing The People. The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in Eng- 
land and America (New York 1988), 207-306; Robert H. Wiebe, The Opening of Ameri- 
can Society. From the Adoption of the Constitution to the Eve of Disunion (New York 1984), 
esp. 22-34; Jack N. Rakove, "The Madisonian Moment," University of Chicago Law 
Review, 55 (Spring 1988), 473-505; James T. Kloppenberg, "The Virtues of Liberal- 
ism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Dis- 
course," Journal of American History, 74 (June 1987), 9-33; Robert E. Shalhope, 
"Thomas Jefferson's Republicanism and Antebellum Southern Thought," Journal of 
Southern History, 42 (Nov. 1976), 529-557. 
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guage and existing governmental structure of republicanism, popular 
political culture in virtually all parts of the United States grew stead- 
ily more egalitarian even before Andrew Jackson's first presidential 
bid in 1824. Informal stump meetings, door-to-door canvassing, bar- 
becues, and the politicization of militia musters, all brought de facto 
democracy to the politics of the early republic well before suffrage 
liberalization and other reforms formally opened the political process 
to virtually all white men. Within this democratizing political culture, 
Jacksonian political parties transformed the republican idea of popu- 
lar sovereignty into an avowed democratic faith in the wisdom of pop- 
ular majorities. Majority rule subtly replaced republican equipoise as 
the political creed of the expanding nation.37 As William Freehling 
has aptly noted, this gradual transformation dichotomized republi- 
cans into two camps, "elitist republicans" who wanted to retain as 
much as possible the eighteenth-century traditions of gentry influ- 
ence, the political prerogatives of property, and minority protection, 
and "egalitarian republicans" interested in expanding participation, 
majority rule, and the defense of the "people" against oligarchic 
power.38 It is true that frontier states certainly favored the democratic 
side of this struggle within an evolving republicanism, but the true 
egalitarian impulse evolved more from the revolutionary heritage of 
popular sovereignty than from frontier circumstances. 
One result of the gradual triumph of egalitarian republicanism 
over its more elitist rival involved the subtle broadening of the popu- 
lar definition of "independence." In some areas "householders," 
heads of households who controlled their own affairs but owned no 
property, were perceived as "independent." In urban areas, artisans, 
craftsmen, and even skilled workers defined their work tools and spe- 
37 For an introduction to these themes, see Steven J. Ross, "The Transforma- 
tion of Republican Ideology," Journal of the Early Republic, 10 (Fall 1990), 323-330; 
Thornton, Politics and Power, 117-162; Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 99-182; 
Rowland Berthoff, "Independence and Attachment, Virtue and Interest: From Re- 
publican Citizen to Free Enterpriser, 1787-1837," in Richard L. Bushman et al, eds., 
Uprooted Americans: Essays to Honor Oscar Handlin (Boston 1979), 97-124; Gordon S. 
Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York 1992), 229-369; and Daniel 
Feller, "Politics and Society: Toward a Jacksonian Synthesis," Journal of the Early 
Republic, 10 (Summer 1990), 135-162. 
38 William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion: Secessionists At Bay, 1776-1854 
(New York 1990), esp. 39-58. Freehling applies this dichotomy only to the antebel- 
lum South. I believe that, with appropriate adjustments for regional diversity, it is a 
distinction that works reasonably well for the republic as whole during the early na- 
tional and Jacksonian years. 
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cific trade skills as their "property," their source of independence, 
and in much of the South and Old Northwest, mere whiteness of skin 
seemed to qualify men as independent. These more generous, more 
inclusive definitions of independence tacitly permitted a fairly thor- 
ough democratization of antebellum political culture while leaving the 
most cherished of republican ideals theoretically intact. Americans 
continued to embrace "independence" as the essence of republican 
citizenship even as the prerequisites for independence were signifi- 
cantly redefined.39 
If the frontier was only one of many factors which played a role in 
democratizing the political culture of American republicanism, it was 
clearly a crucial factor in sustaining a republican social order in the 
face of the "Market Revolution" that followed the War of 1812.40 As 
Drew McCoy has emphasized, the availability of abundant western 
land allowed the young republic to grow economically by expanding 
through space, producing an ever larger agricultural surplus for mar- 
ket, rather than by developing over time, seeking profit through the 
intensification of commerce and industrialization. Because of the 
frontier, the republic sustained a huge and growing population of 
yeoman freeholders, while others (tenants and farm laborers) held a 
reasonable expectation of becoming yeoman freeholders, and still oth- 
ers (artisans and mechanics) identified themselves as the "yeomanry 
of the city." By slowing the process of proletarianization in pre-Civil 
War America, the frontier permitted egalitarian republicanism, with 
its insistence on independence as the basis for citizenship, to postpone 
for a generation its direct confrontation with the market revolution, 
industrialization, and a large, dependent working class.41 
The role of the frontier as a "safety-valve" that allowed the re- 
public to postpone crises by diffusing them across space has become a 
recurrent a theme in recent historical writing. Perhaps the most pro- 
39 Pole, Political Representation, 332-338; Sean Wilentz, "Against Exceptionalism: 
Class Consciousness and the American Labor Movement, 1790-1920," International 
Labor and Working Class History, 26 (Fall 1984), 1-24; Lacy K. Ford, Jr., "Republics 
and Democracy: The Parameters of Political Citizenship in Antebellum South Caro- 
lina," in David R. Chesnutt and Clyde N. Wilson, eds., The Meaning of South Carolina 
History. Essays in Honor of George C. Rogers, Jr. (Columbia, S.C. 1991), 121-145. 
40 Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution. Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New 
York 1991), esp. 70-171. 
41 Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America 
(Chapel Hill 1980), 185-208, 236-259. See also Major L. Wilson, Space, Time and Freedom. The Quest for Nationality and Irrepressible Conflict, 1815-1861 (Westport, Conn. 
1974), 49-72. 
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vocative modern criticism of Turner's overall thesis was developed by 
New Left historian Staughton Lynd in the 1960s.42 Lynd attempted to 
recast Turner's thesis so that it could adequately explain antebellum 
sectional differences.43 Turner, Lynd insisted, not only underesti- 
mated the influence of slavery on American life, but also mistakenly 
included slaveholders in the category of agrarians who championed 
the expansion of democracy. Lynd countered that southern slavehold- 
ers, obsessed with property rights and the defense of minority power, 
sought an alliance with the large capitalists of the North to preserve a 
conservative, aristocratic republic.44 Moreover, Lynd suggested, the 
Constitution represented not a Beardian triumph of capitalists over 
agrarians, but an uneasy compromise between capitalists and slave- 
holders.45 This compromise, tested periodically over three-score years 
and ten, eventually disintegrated in a bloody civil war. What is re- 
markable about the compromise of 1787 is not that it eventually col- 
lapsed, but that it lasted as long as it did. Doubtless an overriding 
desire to see the American experiment in republicanism succeed gave 
the compromise its strength, but according to Lynd and Barrington 
Moore, the frontier helped give the compromise longevity by allowing 
the free-labor economy of the North and the slave-labor economy of 
the South room to expand on parallel tracks without collision.46 
To be sure, the "frontier," or the western territories, became in 
the nineteenth century what the slave trade was in the late eighteenth: 
the primary point of controversy between North and South.47 But 
42 See especially Staughton Lynd, "On Turner, Beard, and Slavery," Journal of 
Negro History, 48 (Oct. 1963), 235-250; and Lynd, "Beyond Beard," in Barton J. 
Bernstein, ed., Toward A New Past. Dissenting Essays in American History (New York 
1968), 46-64. See also Lynd, Class Conflict, Slavery, and the United States Constitution 
(Indianapolis 1967). 
43 An earlier attempt to revise Turner along these lines was made in 1954 in two 
companion essays written by Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick. Part I of their essay 
on democracy in the old Northwest is cited in note sixteen above. See also "A Mean- 
ing for Turner's Frontier, Part II: The Southwest Frontier and New England," 
Political Science Quarterly, 69 (Dec. 1954), 565-602. 
44 Lynd, "On Turner, Beard, and Slavery," 237-244. 
45 Lynd, "Beyond Beard," 58-60. 
46 Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Lord and 
Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston 1966), 111-155; Lynd, "On Turner, 
Beard and Slavery," 235-250. 
47 On this point, see Robert M. Weir, "South Carolina: Slavery and the Struc- 
ture of the Union," in Michael Allen Gillespie and Michael Lienesch, eds., Ratifying 
The Constitution (Lawrence, Kan. 1989), 201-234. 
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these controversies over Missouri, Texas, California, and Kansas all 
were settled, albeit with escalating difficulty, by compromise. The 
controversy over slavery in the territories often precipitated sectional 
crises during the antebellum era, yet the territories themselves were 
the safety-valve which prevented the show-down over slavery from oc- 
curring much earlier in the republic's history.48 King Cotton coveted 
virgin land, and the frontier provided it. Proletarianization threat- 
ened the North's dynamic free-labor economy, but competition from 
newly settled areas encouraged outmigration from the older rural ar- 
eas of the North. The "hidden depression" of the 1850s, which drove 
many former artisans and mechanics into wage labor just as the mas- 
sive post-1848 wave of foreign immigration glutted the market, only 
served to make the situation more volatile. Therefore, the frontier 
loomed larger than ever in the minds of white northerners seeking a 
"safety-valve" to avoid dependency.49 The Republican party's rally- 
ing cry of "free soil, free labor, free men" assumed a new ring of 
urgency, and pressure to ban slave competition from all territories 
intensified. Many northerners worried that the fabled upward mobil- 
ity that Abraham Lincoln celebrated as the "right to rise" might be 
jeopardized permanently. Thus, despite impressive macroeconomic 
growth and rising personal incomes, Americans, North and South, 
were haunted by fears that their status as independent householders 
and their prospects for upward mobility were threatened unless they 
enjoyed continued access to the frontier.50 By the late 1850s, in both 
regions, ideas about independence and opportunity had grown inex- 
tricably tied to the frontier, and the controversy over free or slave 
48 Major L. Wilson, "The Controversy over Slavery Expansion and the Con- 
cept of the Safety Valve: Ideological Confusion in the 1850s," Mississippi Quarterly, 24 
(Spring 1971), 135-153. 
49 Wright, The Political Economy of the Cotton South, 128-157; Jonathan Prude, The 
Coming of Industrial Order. Town and Factory Life in Rural Massachusetts, 1810-1860 
(Cambridge, Mass. 1983); Alan Dawley, Class and Community: The Industrial Revolution 
in Lynn (Cambridge, Mass. 1976); Sean Wilentz, "Artisan Origins of the American 
Working Class," International Labor and Working Class History, 19 (Spring 1981), 1-22; 
Barron, Those Who Stayed Behind, 31-50; Robert W. Fogel, Without Consent or Contract. 
The Rise and Fall of American Slavery (New York 1989), 354-380. 
50 Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. The Ideology of the Republican Party 
Before the Civil War (New York 1971); Robert W. Johanssen, The Frontier, the Union, 
and Stephen A. Douglas (Urbana 1989), 249-252; Lacy K. Ford, Jr., "Toward A Di- 
vided Union," Reviews in American History, 18 (Sept. 1990), 349-356; Major L. Wil- 
son, "The Free Soil Concept of Progress and the Irrepressible Conflict," American 
Quarterly, 22 (Winter 1970), 769-790. 
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labor-essentially a question of equal access to the frontier-proved 
the proximate cause of secession and Civil War. 
Had the opportunity for parallel expansion across the shared fron- 
tier not existed, had not abundant land served as some kind of safety- 
valve for both North and South, it seems probable that the inherent 
contradictions between republican ideas and the material reality of 
both the slave and free labor economies would have been exposed 
much earlier, producing serious internal crises in both regions. These 
earlier crises, coming before the democratic revolution had extended 
full political rights to virtually all white men and established demo- 
cratic politics as the realm of conflict resolution in the United States, 
might well have prompted what Barrington Moore has described as a 
reactionary coalition between northern capitalists and southern plan- 
ters. This conservative coalition of propertied elites might have 
worked to stunt the evolution of political democracy and guide the 
republic down the repressive "Prussian Road" to industrial modern- 
ity.51 Without the yeomanry of the frontier to draw upon, resistance 
to this reactionary coalition would have likely pushed upward from 
below, from hard-pressed artisans and the emerging working class, 
perhaps with some petty bourgeois assistance, in a kind of crude 
American approximation of the failed European revolutions of 1848.52 
Instead, the frontier delayed the crisis, giving the democratic revolu- 
tion time to take hold and allowing the plain folk of both North and 
South time to identify prospects for continued independence and op- 
portunity with the existence of the frontier. By the time the sectional 
tensions reached new heights late in the 1850s, the democratic revolu- 
tion-which the frontier aided but did not cause-had done its work. 
The capitalists of the North knew it was free-soilers and workers they 
must placate and not southern slaveholders. Southern planters knew 
it was the tenaciously independent plain folk, not Yankee entrepre- 
neurs, whom they must convince to sustain slavery. Neither proper- 
tied elite saw a reactionary alliance as a viable option in the face of 
intense political pressures from their respective beleaguered yeoman- 
ries.53 The defining struggle of nineteenth-century America was not 
51 Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 125-141; S.G.F. Spackman, 
"The Frontier and Reform in the United States," The Historical Journal, 8 (June 
1970), 333-339. 
52 For a perspective on the European revolutions, see E. J. Hobsbawm, The Age 
of Capital, 1848-1875 (New York 1979), 3-23. 
53 Thornton, Politics and Power, 398-461; Hahn, Roots of Southern Populism, 86- 
116; Ford, Origins of Southern Radicalism, 338-373; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of 
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between a national propertied elite and the producing masses over 
access to political power, but between sections equally devoted to in- 
dependence and opportunity, each desperately needing the frontier to 
remake in their own image. The result of this struggle was the tri- 
umph of a liberal bourgeois democracy rather than the producers' re- 
public for which the common folk, Union and Confederate, fought.54 
But in shifting the battle onto this ground, Turner's frontier not only 
helped save American democracy but pushed it to seek, albeit at a 
terribly high price in blood, a "new birth of freedom."55 
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Frederick Jackson Turner's thesis of frontier closure in 1890 has 
never quite squared with the facts.' All of the consequences that he 
envisioned for the turn of the century-closed space, sectional ten- 
sion, labor unrest, and the ascent of central state power-had already 
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